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INTRODUCTION: TRIAL BY JURY OR TRIAL BY MOTION?

The New York Law School Law Review's Spring 2012 symposium, TrialbyJury or
Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment Discrimination, was
planned jointly with The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute For Law & Policy
("The Institute"). This collection of articles drawn from the symposium focuses on
pretrial motion practice in employment discrimination cases, with particular
emphasis on the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions making it more likely that
cases would be dismissed in response to pretrial motions. The event brought together
practitioners, judges, and academic scholars to consider the litigation landscape at a
time of heightened pleading requirements, particularly in light of two Supreme
Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Jqbal.2 Although
neither of these was an employment discrimination case, they appeared to establish
new "plausibility" pleading standards for federal civil litigation that could make it
more difficult for cases to survive a motion to dismiss, and thus less likely that
plaintiffs would be able to engage in pretrial discovery.3 These developments followed
earlier Supreme Court decisions that encouraged federal trial courts to dispose of
more cases in response to pretrial motions for summary judgment,4 and seemed
inconsistent with the Court's unanimous decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,s
which arguably described a more liberal pleading standard.

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2.

556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Iqbal, the Court clarified that the plausibility standard established in Twombly
was not limited to the antitrust context of that decision, but applied generally as a construction of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to all federal civil litigation. Id. at 684.

3.

In Twombly, the Court stated that an antitrust case
requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.

550 U.S. at 556.
In Iqbal,the Court amplified this, in the context of a suit concerning the personal liability of high
officials for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of underlings, as a more general interpretation of the
requirements of Rule 8. The Court insisted that the plaintiffs complaint must include factual allegations
from which a court could infer that the allegation of discriminatory intent by the defendant was more
than merely possible; although probability need not be shown, an intermediate level of plausibility was
required. 556 U.S. at 678-79.
4.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

5.

534 U.S. 506 (2002). The central holding of Swierkiewicz was that a plaintiff in a Title VII case need not
allege all the factual prerequisites of a prima facie case in order to survive a dismissal motion, emphasizing
that Rule 8 established a "notice pleading system." Id. at 511. Quoting from a prior case, the Court in
Swierkiewicz observed that the factual statement in a complaint "must simply 'give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" emphasizing that this
"simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to
define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. at 512 (citation omitted). The
Court also observed that this "simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions." Id. at 513.
Furthermore, the words "plausible" and "plausibility" do not appear anywhere in the Court's opinion.
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A member of the Law Review's 2010-2011 editorial board, Eirik Cheverud,
suggested building a symposium around these developments. His determined efforts,
including enlisting me as a faculty advisor, bringing in The Institute as a coplanner and
cosponsor, and persuading the Law Review's editorial board of the importance of the
topic, resulted in a wide-ranging, full-day program of panelists' and a distinguished
keynote speaker, the Honorable Denny Chin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
This collection of articles continues the effort begun by the symposium planners
to bring together diverse viewpoints-albeit viewpoints from the judicial and
plaintiff perspectives, not the defendant perspective-on the current situation facing

employment discrimination plaintiffs in the federal courts. How should employment
discrimination cases be decided? Why do unsettled employment discrimination cases
suffer dismissal at a high rate as a result of pretrial motions?7 The symposium
participants suggest varied answers to these questions, and their different perspectives
should make a useful contribution to the ongoing debate. They document through
statistics and anecdotal evidence that the Supreme Court's rulings have arguably
licensed federal district judges to play the role of a virtual jury, weighing evidence,
drawing inferences (including some that seem biased towards defendants), and
cutting off the plaintiffs case by determining, based on the court's conclusions as to
plausibility, whether a jury would find the legal claim to be proven. While some
contend that this was already occurring pervasively in summary judgment decisions
prior to Twombly,8 Twombly has imported this approach into the earlier stage of prediscovery dismissal motions and motions for judgment on the pleadings. The
Supreme Court's construction of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now
arguably requires more than mere "notice pleading," instead requiring factual
assertions sufficient to make a discrimination claim appear "plausible" to the trial
judge before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery, based on the
limited knowledge that the plaintiff and his or her counsel may have at that stage.

6.

Panelists and speakers included the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, the Honorable Denny Chin, the
Honorable Bernice B. Donald, Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, the Honorable Nancy Gertner,
Elizabeth Grossman, Rebecca M. Hamburg, Diane S. King, Minna J. Kotkin, David L. Lee, Suzette
M. Malveaux, Ann C. McGinley, Scott A. Moss, the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Joseph A. Seiner, Richard T. Seymour, and Suja A. Thomas.

7.

Articles in this symposium issue can be found at 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653-986 (2012-2013). Several
of the symposium articles present statistics documenting that employment discrimination cases suffer
pretrial dismissal at higher rates than other categories of federal civil claims. See, e.g., Hon. Denny
Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment DiscriminationCases: AJudge's Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 671, 672-73 (2012-2013); Hon. Mark W. Bennett, From the "No Spittin', No Cussin' and No
Summary Judgment" Days ofEmployment DiscriminationLitigation to the "Defendant'sSummary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment" Days: One Judge's Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685,

697-701 (2012-2013).
8.

See generally Bennett, supra note 7.

9.

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-63 (2007).
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I.

SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Congress did not enact Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'0 in a vacuum.
As early as the 1940s, state legislators began to propose statutes addressing the
problem of employment discrimination, and states began to enact them. David
Freeman Engstrom's account of the early history of legislation in this field documents
the unfolding debate about how best to enforce statutory policies against employment
discrimination. 1 He identifies a bill introduced in the Michigan state legislature in
1943 as "the first fully enforceable law prohibiting job discrimination ever proposed
in any legislature in the United States."12 This bill, which was not enacted, would
have prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race or color, creed, sex,
or national origin. It made employment discrimination a misdemeanor, a criminal
offense, and authorized fines of up to $500 and imprisonment of up to six months for
discriminatory actions by employers. It also created a private civil right of action for
back pay, and authorized class actions. It empowered what was then the Michigan
Department of Labor and Industry to hold public hearings and to issue cease-anddesist orders, as well as orders to take "affirmative action including the hiring,
re-hiring or training of employees discriminated against.""
Under this early legislative proposal, there was a mix ofjudicial and administrative
remedies. Criminal law enforcement authorities were authorized to act upon
complaints. Individuals were authorized to sue for make-whole relief Groups of
employees were authorized to form classes and to bring suit collectively, making back
pay actions against large employers feasible. A state executive branch agency was
authorized to undertake the function of administrative hearings and to order
administrative remedies. Although the legislators had proposed an array of remedial
pathways, a central feature of the bill was the right to sue and have a day in court,
albeit with limited relief.14
Engstrom reports that state legislatures and Congress were literally flooded with
proposals to enact employment discrimination statutes after World War II, with the
first being enacted in New York in 1945. By the time Title VII was enacted in 1964,
"nearly two dozen nonsouthern states that were home to more than ninety percent of
African Americans outside the South had already enacted legislation mandating
equal treatment in employment." 5
The major focus of Professor Engstrom's article is on the tension-a heated and
intense debate among civil rights advocates-over how employment discrimination
cases should be handled. There was a significant divide between those who favored
10.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).

11.

David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins ofAmerican FairEmployment Law: Regulatory Choice and the
Making ofModern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071 (2011).

12.

Id. at 1073.

13.

Id. at 1072-73.

14.

See id. at 1072.

15.

Id. at 1079.
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enlisting the courts as the main battleground and those who preferred an
administrative approach, usually through the establishment of a Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC) that would be authorized to investigate, conciliate,
hold hearings, and issue cease-and-desist orders, following the model for adjudicatory
administrative agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board. Advocates of
the FEPC approach feared that the costs and delays inherent in litigation would pose
significant barriers to vindicating plaintiffs' rights, and many of the pre-Title VII
enactments embraced the administrative approach. A government-funded agency,
designed to investigate, conciliate, award remedies, and seek enforcement in the
courts under a deferential standard of review looked to some like the preferred
mechanism, and this was an approach of many early statutes. But such a method
could only be satisfactory with a well-funded administrative effort equal to the case
load, and early statutes that embraced this approach have not lived up to the
theoretical promise.'6
When Congress passed Title VII, it emphasized the administrative approach by
creating the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),1 7 by requiring
that claims under Title VII be filed first with the EEOC or a state or local agency
with comparable jurisdiction and remedial powers," and by providing for
administrative investigation and conciliation as prerequisites to court action.19 The
EEOC was not empowered to initiate litigation; rather, the statute authorized the
U.S. Attorney General to initiate litigation at the request of the EEOC, but the
statute also authorized private lawsuits by parties who had exhausted their
administrative remedies. 20 Relief was limited to equitable remedies (including makewhole relief reduced by mitigation requirements) so jury trials were not provided.
Congress subsequently amended the statute to authorize the EEOC to bring some
cases on its own, and eventually, in 1991, Congress authorized jury trials for
allegations of intentional discrimination and possible compensatory and punitive
damages (subject to a statutory cap). 2 1
II. THE TWOMBLYAND IQBAL DECISIONS

The 1991 amendments authorizing jury trials and expanding remedial relief
would appear to have been intended to enhance the availability of a day in court for
plaintiffs. These developments would naturally contribute to an increase in federal
court filings under Title VII, but at the same time the Supreme Court's "trilogy" of
16.

Id.passim.

17.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352 § 705, 78 Stat. 258 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4
(2006)).

18.

See id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(f)(1) (2006)).

19.

Id.

20. Id. §§ 705(g)(6), 706(b), (e), 78 Stat. 258-60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e4(g)(6),
2005-e5(b) (2006)).
21.

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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summary judgment cases from the 1980S22 would encourage employers to file more
motions for summary judgment and trial courts to grant them. As the proportion of
the federal district court caseloads devoted to employment discrimination claims
grew, pretrial motion practice accelerated as well, and the rate of summary judgments
granted to employers grew. The Supreme Court, already very conservative in the
1980s and 1990s, became more conservative in the new century with the appointments
by President George W. Bush of Chief Justice John Roberts to replace Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Samuel Alito to replace Associate Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. This Supreme Court majority seems dedicated to further
narrowing plaintiffs' access to federal trials, the key cases being Twombly and Iqbal,
decided after these appointments had changed the composition of the Court that
decided Swierkiewicz. 23
At first glance, it would be difficult to see the relevance of Twombly to an
employment discrimination claim. The case concerned a class action by consumers
under the federal antitrust laws, contending that there was a conspiracy among local
telephone and Internet service providers to avoid competition through agreements to
allocate territory and customers. 24 When they filed suit, the plaintiffs asserted that
such a conspiracy existed and recited instances of parallel business conduct by the
defendants as supporting the conspiracy allegation. 25 The Supreme Court decided
these factual allegations were not enough to state a "plausible" case. 26 A majority of
the Court found that because the parallel business conduct could be simply explained
as an instance of competitors independently arriving at their own decisions about
how to price and market their services, it was not enough for the plaintiffs to allege a
conspiracy in order to put the defendants to the burden of submitting to discovery. 27
The Court saw the allegation of a conspiracy or agreement as "conclusory"-not a
factual allegation entitled to the presumption of being true that a trial court would
normally apply in determining a motion to dismiss-and rejected the lower court's
reliance on a prior Supreme Court decision stating that a case should not be dismissed
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief."28 In order to survive such a motion,
22.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

23.

Twombly was a 7-2 decision, with Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissenting. Iqbal
was 5-4, with the Twombly dissenters being joined in dissent by Justice David Souter (the author of the
majority opinion in Twombly) and Justice Stephen Breyer. The Justices appointed after Swierkiewicz was
decided helped make up the majority in Twombly and Iqbal, decisively so in Iqbal given the division of
the Court over extending Twombly-with its particular focus on the context of antitrust litigationmore generally as an across-the-board rule of federal civil litigation.

24.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548-50 (2007).

25.

Id. at 550-51.

26.

Id. at 556-57.

27.

Id. at 557-60.

28.

Id. at 557, 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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the plaintiffs now had to allege facts from which a plausible inference could be drawn
that there was an actual agreement among the defendants, not just the appearance of
an agreement suggested by their overt business conduct. These facts would necessarily
have to be based on the plaintiffs' own investigations, without the benefit of discovery.
Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting, objected to the idea
that a complainant had to do much more under Rule 8 than to give notice to the
defendants of the legal theory under which they were being sued. 29
Twombly seemed inconsistent with the Federal Rules themselves. Rule 8 requires
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief"30 Should not an allegation that defendants conspired to eliminate competition

in a particular market and acted in a manner consistent with such an allegation be
enough to survive a motion to dismiss under a rule providing that a complaint must
offer "a short and plain statement of the claim"? If the signs of parallel conduct
would be consistent with the existence of an agreement, should not the parties have
an opportunity to conduct discovery in search of evidence? Does Rule 8's requirement
that the plaintiffs allegations must show "that the pleader is entitled to relief"1
mean that the plaintiffs complaint must set forth the evidentiary basis for the
plaintiff's claim, before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery?32
As plaintiffs in an antitrust case are seeking to vindicate not only their own interests
as competitors or consumers but also the public interest, as articulated by Congress
in the antitrust laws, should not an allegation of the existence of smoke be sufficient
to authorize discovery in search of an underlying fire? A reader of the Court's opinion
could conclude that the Court's emphasis on the antitrust context of the case and the
particular burdens of discovery that would be imposed in a nationwide class action
against a huge industry might mean that the Court was setting up a special pleading
requirement for antitrust class actions.
But Iqbal exploded that possibility. Like Twombly, Iqbal was not an employment
discrimination case. But in Iqbal, this time by a bare 5-4 majority, the Court
indicated that Twombly's factual pleading standard applied broadly to all pleadings
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Iqbal was another case in which the
29.

Id. at 570-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens voiced "fear that the unfortunate result of the
majority's new pleading rule will be to invite lawyers' debates over economic theory to conclusively
resolve antitrust suits in the absence of any evidence." Id. at 595.

30. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
31.

Id.

32.

This would surely be inconsistent with Swierkiewicz, where the Court rejected the contention that the
plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to meet the test for a prima facie case under its seminal
Title VII decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).

33.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). Rejecting the argument that Twombly should be limited to
pleadings in antitrust cases, the Court stated:
Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the
decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. 550 U.S., at 554.
That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in
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particular issues in dispute might have signaled a ruling confined to the factual
setting: a person rounded up in the security panic after the 9/11 terror attacks
asserted a claim of unconstitutional treatment in detention, naming as defendants,
among others, the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).3 4 These defendants sought dismissal on grounds of qualified
immunity. Instead of relying on the qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court
invoked Twombly and said that it was not enough for the plaintiff to allege that
Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller shared
responsibility for the mistreatment that the plaintiff had suffered in custody. The
Court characterized such allegations as "conclusory"-the epithet it had attached to
the plaintiffs' allegations in Twombly-and, thus, not entitled to be assumed to be
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss." Instead, the Court said, only factual
assertions about the specific role alleged to have been played by those named
defendants were entitled to be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, and
then the trial court would have to decide whether, if those factual assertions were
assumed to be true, they gave rise to a "plausible inference" of discriminatory intent
towards the plaintiff. 6
This sounds very much like telling lower federal courts that they are to apply
something akin to the summary judgment standard for evaluating factual allegations
in deciding whether the defendant is entitled to dismissal of a complaint as a matter
of law. Our symposium participants suggest that some federal courts have taken it
that way-that the courts have applied this heightened standard in employment
discrimination cases, even though the Court did not expressly overrule its own
precedent, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,3 7 which had described a less demanding
notice pleading approach under Rule 8, and had emphasized authorization of liberal
pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules in the context of employment litigation.
III. THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

So, we come back to the underlying policy question: Who should decide
employment discrimination cases, and how?
According to the federal employment discrimination statutes read in light of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, what should the process and standard be for
determining whether a plaintiff gets his or her day in court? Does the federal
the United States district courts." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for "all civil actions," ibid., and it applies to antitrust
and discrimination suits alike. See 550 U.S., at 555-556, and n. 3.
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
34. Id. at 666-68.
35.

Id. at 681.

36. Id. at 682-83.
37. 534 U.S. 506 (2002); see supra text accompanying note 5. Of course, Justice Kennedy did state in Iqbal
that the Twombly construction of Rule 8 applied to all federal civil litigation, including discrimination
cases. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684; see supra text accompanying note 33.
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litigation record of the recent past accord with congressional intent expressed in Title
VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, about how these cases should be
decided? And, if not, what can be done about it?
In constructing this program, the planners decided to begin with a view from the
bench, to bring together federal trial and appellate judges who have had the difficult
task of presiding over employment discrimination cases over the period of these
evolving interpretations of Title VII and the Federal Rules. Several of the judicial
participants in the symposium's first panel (A View from the Bench-The Judges'
Perspectiveon Summary judgment in Employment DiscriminationCases)38 and the keynote
speaker for the symposium," all of whom had served as federal trial judges for some or

all of this period, have authored or coauthored articles published in this symposium.
Judge Denny Chin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who
served from 1994 through 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, offers an overall judicial perspective on summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases, reflecting both his trial and appellate experience,
drawn from his keynote remarks. 40 While acknowledging the statistics showing the
high rate of discrimination cases lost through pretrial motions, Judge Chin suggests
that the large proportion of pro se litigants, together with shortcomings in advocacy
on behalf of plaintiffs, have contributed to the problem. 4 1 The Honorable Mark W.
Bennett of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, an outspoken
proponent of allowing more employment discrimination cases to go to trial, documents
the stark decline in trials and a general judicial bias in favor of granting summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases, arguing that allowing more cases to go
to trial would not only be fairer to plaintiffs, but would also be more closely in accord
with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution as well as the framers of Rules 8
and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 2 The Honorable Bernice B. Donald,
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, who previously served as a trial
judge in the Western District ofTennessee and as a BankruptcyJudge, has collaborated
with her former clerk, J. Eric Pardue, who is now practicing with Vinson & Elkins
LLP, in Houston. 43 Their article focuses on the allegation that the federal judiciary is
38. N.Y. Law Sch. Law Review, Summary Judgment and Employment Discrimination Symposium - PanelI
(Apr.23, 2012), YouTUBE (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= c8rrleRpxc.
39. The Honorable Denny Chin, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, Keynote Address at the New
York Law School Law Review Symposium: Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal,
and Employment Discrimination (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcHZAA1Mrk&feature=youtu.be.
40. See Chin, supra note 7.
41.

Id. at 675.

42.

Bennett, supra note 7. Indeed, Judge Bennett suggests that if he were able to change the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, his "first edict would be to eliminate summary judgment altogether... for a five- to ten-year
period to evaluate the pros and cons of our federal justice system without summary judgment." Id. at 710.

43.

Hon. Bernice B. Donald &J. Eric Pardue, BringingBack Reasonable Inferences:A Short, Simple Suggestion
for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection ofEmployment Discriminationand SummaryJudgment, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749 (2012-2013).

667

INTRODUCTION: TRIAL BY JURY OR TRIAL BY MOTION?

biased against employment discrimination plaintiffs, with a particular focus on
inferences that many courts draw in favor of defendants in the context of deciding
pretrial motions. They find this allegation to be borne out by the evidence of certain
"doctrines" that courts summon to explain away factual allegations suggestive of
discriminatory intent. They suggest that courts should take much more seriously "the
Supreme Court's instruction to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party" in deciding summary judgment motions.44 Harvard Law Professor and
former U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner and Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider of
Brooklyn Law School, 45 focus on the "substantive law dimensions" of the procedural
decisions that federal courts make in employment discrimination cases, taking the

Supreme Court's narrowing of the availability of class actions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes46 as the starting point for their argument.
The other articles from the symposium mix commentary from practitioners and
academics. Professor Suzette M. Malveaux of the Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law, examines whether Twombly and Iqbal have actually
changed the direction of employment discrimination litigation. 4 7 After reviewing
empirical studies, Malveaux concludes that the impact of these cases "remains
elusive." "[E]mpirical data alone" cannot answer the question whether the heightened
pleading standard under Rule 8 announced in these cases has made a major difference,
she writes, in light of the strong trend towards granting employers' summary
judgment motions that predated these cases. 48 Professor Deborah Thompson
Eisenberg of the University of Maryland School of Law turns the focus to summary
judgment in Equal Pay Act cases, documenting the steady increase of dispositions by
summary judgment on claims that are heavily based on factual disputes and shining
a light on the practices of trial courts in dealing with these cases to figure out why
summary judgment is being so frequently granted in an area where the parties
typically sharply dispute the facts. 49 Professor Ann C. McGinley of the William S.
Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, focusing on one of the most significant
"reverse discrimination" cases under Title VII, Ricci v. DeStefano,so explores the
theory of "cognitive illiberalism" as an explanation for the Supreme Court's decision
44.

Id. at 762-63.

45.

Elizabeth M. Schneider & Hon. Nancy Gertner, "Only Procedural" Thoughts on the Substantive Law
Dimensions of PreliminaryProceduralDecisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L.

REV. 767 (2012-2013). Judge Gertner served in the District of Massachusetts.
46. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
47.

Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Outfor Civil Rights and Employment
Cases Post-Iqbal,57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719 (2012-2013).

48.

Id. at 722.

49.

Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse ofSummaryJudgment in Equal
Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 815 (2012-2013).

50. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). A "reverse discrimination" case is a claim of discrimination in favor of minorities; in this
case, white firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut, claimed that the city set aside the results of a promotion
examination because minority firefighters did not score highly enough to be promoted. Id. at 561.
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to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs rather than to remand that case for trial,
despite the sharply contested facts of why the employer acted as it did in setting aside
the results of a promotion test that appeared to produce a significant disparate impact
on the basis of race.s1 Professor Scott A. Moss of the University of Colorado Law
School contributes a searching critique of the briefs submitted by counsel for
employment discrimination plaintiffs in opposition to Rule 12 dismissal motions and
Rule 56 summary judgment motions, suggesting that one of the contributing factors
to the high rate of pretrial judgments in favor of employers may be significant
shortcomings in advocacy-a point that Judge Chin also makes in his article.5 2
Finally, two Chicago employment law practitioners, David L. Lee and Jennifer C.

Weiss, have collaborated on an article that contrasts how the process of drawing
inferences from facts in employment discrimination cases substantially differs from
judicial inference-drawing in other areas of federal litigation, again showing judicial
predisposition to give employers the benefit of the doubt in cases where disputes over
the meaning of facts should arguably be left to jurors.53 They launch their inquiry
with a fascinating look at the oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp. and the subsequent decision by that
court, 54 providing startlingly direct evidence for their thesis. They then show how
federal courts employ a long list of standard "anti-inference doctrines" (previously
identified in a survey of plaintiff employment lawyers) 55 to justify granting pretrial
rulings against employment discrimination plaintiffs, developing in detail how those
doctrines run counter to the approach of federal courts in other kinds of cases.
Taken together, the articles published as part of this symposium issue provide an
in-depth look at pretrial motion practice in employment discrimination cases from the
perspective of those on the front lines as well as in the academy, together with many
practical suggestions that should be useful to counsel for plaintiffs and instructive for
judges seeking to provide fair consideration to plaintiffs when ruling on such motions.

51.

Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII An Examination of Ricci v.
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